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POLICY ESSAY 
New Challenges for Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean – An 
Australian Perspective 
Sam Batemana and Anthony Berginb 
 
aAustralian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, 
Australia, and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore; bAustralian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Canberra. 
 
The Indian Ocean region is growing in strategic importance. It is facing the risks of 
growing strategic competition, particularly between China and India. However, the 
region tends to be neglected by Australia despite extensive interests in the region and the 
possibility of threats to Australia’s security emerging from the region, including the risks 
of intrastate conflict, terrorism, smuggling in all its forms, and illegal fishing. Climate 
change, sea-level rise and natural disasters are other non-traditional security threats 
evident in the region. The northwest of Australia is particularly exposed to these 
challenges to maritime security and requires more attention in Australia’s security 
planning. More broadly, there is a range of other initiatives that Australia might take to 
engage more constructively in the region and help to enhance regional maritime security 
and oceans management. 
 
Keywords: Indian Ocean; maritime security; energy security; strategic environment; 
non-traditional security threats 
 
1. Australia’s Interests in the Indian Ocean 
Stephen Smith, the (then) Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, observed in a 
talk in Perth in July 2010 that the security of the waters of the Indian Ocean “goes to the heart 
of Australia’s national interests” (Smith 2010, p. 2). This reflected the views in Australia’s 
2009 Defence White Paper that the “Indian Ocean will have greater strategic significance in 
the period to 2030” (Australian Government 2009, p. 37).. Hence, Australia’s “Defence 
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planners will need to focus increasingly on the operating conditions and demands of this 
region” (Australian Government 2009, p. 52). 
 
There can be little doubt that Australia should be giving greater attention to the Indian 
Ocean. The Indian Ocean is the world’s third largest ocean. Australia is a major stakeholder 
in affairs of the Indian Ocean region (IOR), including its security and stability.  Australia has 
a larger area of maritime jurisdiction than any other Indian Ocean country (Bateman and 
Bergin 2010, p. 12). This is nearly six million square kilometres, or about eighty per cent of 
the continental land mass of Australia, and much of it is continental shelf rich in hydrocarbon 
reserves. 
 
Australia’s greatest challenges with protecting borders, offshore sovereignty and 
sovereign rights are off its west coast, particularly the northwest. This is a consequence of the 
region’s proximity to “jumping off spots” for illegal access into Australia from the north. 
Australia has extensive offshore interests in the Indian Ocean with strategically important 
island territories, vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and hugely valuable offshore oil 
and gas reserves off the northwest coast. Some of these reserves are 500 kilometres offshore. 
Among Australia’s Indian Ocean island territories, the Cocos and Keeling islands, in 
particular, have great strategic value, although currently little use is made of them. 
 
Despite these extensive interests, Australia has seriously neglected the IOR. Australia 
often forgets that it is a three-ocean country. It rediscovers the Indian Ocean at roughly 
fifteen year intervals: in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Soviet Union moved into 
Afghanistan, and again in the mid-1990s when Australia took a leading role in attempting to 
build cooperation across the IOR. Australia is now rediscovering the Indian Ocean with the 
present Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade declaring in a speech in November 2010 that 
“now Australia must look west, to the great challenges and opportunities that now present 
themselves across the Indian Ocean region” (Rudd 2010). 
 
2. Strategic Environment 
In a much quoted article in 2009, Robert Kaplan (2009), argued that the Indian Ocean will be 
centre stage for the security challenges of the twenty-first century. The IOR is becoming both 
more militarised and more-nuclearised (Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 25). Largely due to 
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concerns over energy security, extra-regional powers are seeking to maintain and extend their 
presence in the region thus complicating the overall strategic outlook of the region. 
 
Geo-political differences are becoming very evident in the IOR, particularly between 
the rising powers of India and China. Both India and China feel that they are being 
strategically contained by the other. India aspires to dominate the region by enlarging its 
security perimeter. In the expansive views of some Indian strategic thinkers, this extends 
“from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and from the coast of Africa to the 
western shores of Australia” (Berlin 2010, p. 55). Indian strategists generally have opposed 
the presence of great powers in the Indian Ocean, which they privately consider “India’s 
lake’ (Townshend 2010, p. 2). 
 
Meanwhile China is strongly cultivating its regional economic and strategic links in 
the IOR, including the establishment of a support network for possible naval operations 
(Kostecka 2010). In Beijing’s view, China’s strategic situation would be seriously impaired 
should India achieve the goal of enlarging its security perimeter and achieving a position of 
dominance in the IOR (Berlin 2010, p. 61). 
 
At present, the United States dominates the IOR strategically and militarily. Its 
principal concerns are maintaining the security of its oil supplies from the Middle East and 
countering terrorism and Muslim extremism. Potentially the United States has the leverage to 
act as a broker between India and China should their bilateral relationship deteriorate. Yet the 
future will almost certainly see a decline in American influence in the region as the United 
States struggles to maintain its defence presence in the face of a poorly performing economy, 
as well as its legitimacy among the peoples of the region, many of whom are Muslim. As 
Kaplan has argued (2010, p. 278), the plain truth is “the gradual loss of the Indian and 
western Pacific oceans as veritable American military lakes”. 
 
These trends mean that the strategic environment Australia faces in the IOR is 
increasingly uncertain. Australia will have an opportunity to do something about this through 
being co-chair with Malaysia of the maritime security experts working group established by 
the ASEAN Plus Eight Defence Ministers’ meeting (ADMM+8). This forum might be 
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steered towards consideration of the situation in the Indian Ocean with possible dialogue 
between the U.S., China and India in a politically neutral forum (Townshend 2010, p. 3). 
 
3. Maritime Security Threats in the Indian Ocean 
Maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean range from the traditional through to the non-
traditional. The following might be identified from an Australian perspective: 
 The threat of major intra-state conflict in which Australia became involved leading to 
possible raids or air attacks against Australia. 
 Terrorist attack against vulnerable points in the region, particularly offshore oil and 
gas installations and other mining infrastructure. 
 Non-traditional security threats, including the smuggling of people, arms and drugs, 
illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and maritime natural disasters. 
 
Major Intra-State Conflict 
Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper states that “after careful examination, it is the 
Government’s view that it would be premature to judge that war among states, including the 
major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the international system” (Australian 
Government 2009, p. 22), and that “Shows of force by rising powers are likely to become 
more common as their military capabilities expand” (Australian Government 2009, p. 22),. 
India and China would be the main powers of concern in the latter judgment. 
 
Any conflict between India and China would likely be partly played out in the Indian 
Ocean. Should Australia become involved, it would open up the possibility of attacks on the 
vulnerable northwest coast. Australia’s energy and mineral exports from the northwest to 
China could become a valid strategic target for India in its conflict with China. While this 
scenario is an extremely remote possibility, it should not be assumed that Australia would be 
supportive of India. India’s hegemonic aspirations in the Indian Ocean could lead to rash 
actions contrary to Australia’s interests that might jeopardise Australia’s trade with China. 
 
Terrorist Attack 
Maritime terrorist attacks are a threat across the IOR due to the presence of extremist groups, 
including in neighbouring countries to Australia’s north. The terrorist attack in Mumbai in 
November 2008 showed the risks of terrorist attack from the sea if coastal waters are not 
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secure. Attacks on offshore facilities have occurred in the past. Three offshore Iraqi oil 
terminals were attacked in the Persian Gulf in 2003 by explosive-laden speedboats. 
 
Terrorists contemplating a terrorist attack against Australia would recognise that the 
offshore oil and gas facilities in the northwest of Australia are a significant national 
vulnerability that is not protected as well as they should be. Arrangements to protect these 
facilities, port terminals and pipelines are major considerations for our national security 
planning. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and other security forces should be in a 
position to respond at short notice to a terrorist threat to offshore and coastal infrastructure. 
However, due to the location of our existing Defence bases, the ADF is not in this position at 
present. 
 
Non-Traditional Security Threats 
While traditional security risks are evident in the IOR with the tensions and conflict in the 
Middle East and Indian sub-continent, the region also faces extensive non-traditional security 
threats. These include climate change and possible rising sea levels, transnational crimes 
(particularly piracy, drug and arms trafficking, and people smuggling), food shortages, 
disease and famine, IUU fishing, and maritime natural hazards, such as tsunamis, cyclones 
and floods. All these threats have a significant maritime dimension and pose major risks in 
the northwest of Australia in particular. Through 2009 and 2010, there has been a marked 
increase in the numbers of asylum seekers trying to enter Australia by sea, mostly across the 
Timor Sea and the northwest Indian Ocean. 
 
IUU fishing is a serious problem in the Indian Ocean, including off the Australia’s 
northwest coast (Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 29). Increased demand and the depletion of 
fish stocks elsewhere in the world have led to more fishing in the Indian Ocean and an 
increasing presence of fishing vessels from outside of the region. The involvement of these 
vessels is facilitated largely because there is no effective regime for regional fisheries 
management. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) is ineffective as a regional 
fisheries management organisation. 
 
Marine natural hazards arise through climate change, tropical storms, tsunamis and 
other severe oceanic conditions. Southeast Asia and other parts of the IOR are prone to these 
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hazards, and scientific findings suggest that the intensity and frequency of disasters arising 
from these hazards is increasing. 
 
4. The Vulnerable Northwest 
Although often overlooked in Australia’s defence planning, the northwest of the continent 
has always been Australia’s most exposed flank. During World War II, the Japanese 
repeatedly bombed towns along the northwest coast as far south as Exmouth Gulf. These air 
raids against the northwest have lessons for defence planning through to the present day. 
They show the area’s vulnerability as a consequence of its exposure to the Indian Ocean and 
its proximity to major centres to the north and northwest from which raids or attacks against 
Australia might be launched. 
 
The vulnerability of the northwest was appreciated in Australia’s defence planning 
from the 1970s through to the early 1990s when Australia was pursuing an active policy of 
defence self-reliance, and the so-called Defence of Australia (DOA) scenarios provided the 
basis for planning. The Dibb Review of 1986 supported the notion of credible contingencies 
based on assessments of regional capabilities to attack Australia. These were contingencies at 
the lower levels of conflict mainly the threat of raids and air attacks against northern 
settlements and offshore islands, rather than actual lodgements of enemy forces on Australian 
territory (Australian Government 1986, p. 53). 
 
This focus on minor attacks as the more credible contingencies was maintained in 
Australian defence planning through until early this century. However, a more favourable 
regional security environment, specifically a more mature relationship with Indonesia, led to 
some watering down of the risks of low level conflict. The 2000 Defence White Paper 
considered that even minor attacks against Australia were improbable but that “circumstances 
might change in ways that make the prospect less unlikely” (Australian Government 2000, p. 
10). 
 
These past assessments reflected a view that the northwest of the continent was 
remote with relatively little critical national infrastructure. All that has changed. Offshore oil 
and gas developments on the continental shelf off northwestern Australia are now major 
strategic interests for Australia. They are central to Australia’s future prosperity and security, 
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but despite their vulnerability, their importance seems underappreciated in national strategic 
planning. 
 
Western Australia is turning into a regional and global energy hub. Karratha and Port 
Hedland are being developed as “Pilbara cities”, and new ports and other towns are planned 
for the northwest (WA Government 2009). These vital elements of critical national 
infrastructure are located on Australia’s strategically exposed western flank a long distance 
from existing ADF main bases near Darwin and Perth. Despite the assessments in the 2009 
Defence White Paper of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, Australia’s defence 
facilities to support operations in the region are limited. 
 
The ‘bare’ air bases at Learmonth (about 1200 kilometres from Perth) and Curtin 
(about 1000 kilometres from Darwin) are rarely activated. They were developed over three 
decades ago to provide support for maritime, air and land operations in DOA scenarios 
popular in defence planning at the time. Operations of the Army Reserve regional force 
surveillance in the Pilbara and the Kimberley regions have been reduced due to budgetary 
restrictions (Dodd 2009). There is not a naval base between Perth and Darwin. It is over 
3000 kilometres from Perth to Darwin, and the ADF could be slow in responding to an 
offshore contingency in the Pilbara region. 
 
This decline in defence activity in the west suggests some lack of appreciation in 
Canberra of just what is occurring off the West coast. A long-term policy objective for 
Australia should now be to increase the Defence presence in the northwest. This would help 
demonstrate Australia’s interest in the Indian Ocean and support the development plans of the 
Australian and Western Australian governments for new ports and towns in the west and 
northwest. 
 
There will be arguments against the development of new Defence facilities in the 
northwest on grounds of costs and the ability of the ADF to deploy rapidly if necessary 
(Bateman and Bergin 2010, p. 60). A new base is contrary to the current policy of reducing 
the size and costs of the Defence estate. However, that was a consideration for military bases 
and facilities established many years ago, mainly in the southeast of the continent, in different 
strategic circumstances. It fails to recognise the greater strategic importance of the Indian 
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Ocean and the growing national infrastructure in a region that was previously considered of 
relatively little strategic interest. 
 
Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper gave no attention to developments in the 
northwest and the implications for our defence planning. The paper states that the primary 
obligation of the Australian Defence Force is “to deter and defeat attacks on Australia” 
(Australian Government 2009, p. 58). It goes on to state that this “entails a fundamentally 
maritime strategy, for which Australia requires forces that can operate with decisive effect 
throughout the northern maritime and littoral approaches to Australia” (Australian 
Government 2009, p. 59). However, it fails to acknowledge the vulnerabilities in the 
northwest.  There is no reference to the strategic and economic importance of the oil and gas 
developments offshore in the northwest or to mining developments in the west more 
generally. 
 
5. Regional Maritime Initiatives 
The strong political framework on which to build the necessary cooperation to meet the 
maritime security challenges of the IOR is lacking at present. The Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) has not been effective although it may be 
revitalised in 2011 when India and Australia assume the positions of Chair and Vice-Chair of 
the association respectively (Bateman 2010, pp. 28 – 29). The ADMM+8 maritime experts 
working group is another potential forum in which maritime cooperation might be discussed. 
 
Prospective initiatives that Australia might take in the maritime domain of the IOR 
include ones is the areas of maritime security cooperation, fisheries management, maritime 
safety, marine scientific research, people smuggling by sea, and the mitigation of marine 
national hazards.  These initiatives might be launched on a region-wide basis, at a sub-
regional level, or bilaterally depending on the particular issue. 
 
It has been claimed that the ‘troubled maritime environment’ of the IOR requires 
‘greater naval military presence and surveillance” (Rao 2010, p. 134).  India has promoted 
the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) to foster the necessary cooperation between 
navies and coast guards in the IOR. However, extra-regional countries with significant 
interests in the region were not invited to participate (Cordner 2010, p.79). The IONS 
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deserves support from Australia provided it is an inclusive forum and has a clear sense of 
purpose. Closer to home, Australia might initiate regular trilateral talks with Indonesia and 
Timor Leste on the maritime security challenges of the Timor Sea. 
 
Australia might take a lead in promoting oceans management in the IOR. In addition 
to common interests in economic development, security and trade, the Indian Ocean itself is a 
major common interest of IOR coastal and island states. Maritime issues are a compelling 
common interest. The ocean has rich fish stocks, but they are seriously under-managed and 
largely exploited by non-Indian Ocean countries. Arrangements for managing the ocean and 
its resources are under-developed in comparison with the Pacific Ocean. 
 
Fisheries management should be a priority area for regional engagement. Australia 
has relevant expertise and could invest more effort in ensuring that cooperative fisheries 
management arrangements in the Indian Ocean are effective. Australia might also assist with 
building the capacity of selected regional countries for fisheries management, and EEZ 
management more generally. This would be particularly useful for countries of East Africa 
and some of the island countries that have large EEZs and valuable fish stocks that are mainly 
exploited at present by foreign fishing interests.  
 
The Indian Ocean has several unique characteristics. Unlike the Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans, it is enclosed on three sides by land masses. As a consequence, oceanic currents in 
the Indian Ocean reverse during the year in a way that does not occur in the other major 
oceans. The strong through-flow of water from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the 
Indonesian archipelago is another factor which has a strong impact on oceanographic 
conditions in the latter ocean. Unfortunately however, the thorough marine scientific research 
to analyse these factors fully and to assess their implications is not available. 
 
The Indian Ocean is the most under-researched of all the world’s oceans. Political 
differences have inhibited marine scientific research in the past. There is a close link between 
oceanographic conditions and regional weather patterns. Better oceanographic knowledge 
would markedly improve climate research with benefits for all IOR countries, including 
providing the ability to predict severe weather events, such as cyclones and periods of 
drought. With better oceanographic knowledge of the Indian Ocean, it may have been 
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possible to predict the disastrous floods in Pakistan thus providing the opportunity for better 
preparations to be made in advance to mitigate the consequences of this appalling natural 
disaster. 
 
Improving marine scientific research in the region is essentially a cooperative activity 
and there is much scope for action in this regard. There is scope for Australian leadership in 
fostering marine scientific research in the IOR, especially in the eastern part of the ocean. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The need for Australia’s defence and foreign policies to give greater attention to the Indian 
Ocean is accentuated by the developing strategic uncertainties of that ocean, growing trade in 
with the IOR, the enormous economic and strategic significance of Australia’s mining, oil 
and gas developments along the northwest coast, and the expansion of the vital national 
infrastructure in that area. 
 
It is likely that surveillance and enforcement in the Indian Ocean will require much 
greater effort from Australia in the future. The likelihood of increased IUU fishing requiring 
policing on the high seas, more illegal fishing incursions into Australian waters, larger fishing 
boats, and the possibility of economic refugees, even coming perhaps directly from Africa 
helped along by favourable weather, are all considerations. Oil and gas rigs will be located 
further out to sea on the extended continental shelf in the Indian Ocean. Increased shipping 
traffic and other maritime activity in the IOR may mean a higher number of search and rescue 
incidents in Australia’s large search and rescue region in the Indian Ocean. 
 
To summarise, the following are some policy initiatives that Australia might take to 
meet growing maritime security challenges in the Indian Ocean: 
 As a broad strategic objective, Australia should increase its strategic presence in the 
IOR through more proactive regional relations and a wide spectrum of increased 
activity in the region. 
 Australia might propose that maritime security and oceans management issues might 
be included on the agenda of future meetings of the IOR-ARC 
 Maritime security in the IOR might also be discussed at the ADMM+8 
maritime.security experts working group. 
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 Australia could host a future Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), provided the 
symposium is an inclusive gathering and has a clear sense of purpose. 
 Australia should make a greater effort to ensure that cooperative fisheries 
management arrangements in the Indian Ocean are effective. 
 Assistance in building local capacity for fisheries management, and EEZ management 
more generally, should be an important component of Australia’s regional aid 
programs. 
 Australia should take action to promote cooperative marine scientific research in the 
IOR and to enhance the ability of the region to predict and mitigate the impact of 
maritime natural disasters. 
 Most importantly, the ADF should plan to markedly increase its presence along the 
west coast of Australia between Perth and Darwin. 
 
These are just some of the initiatives that Australia might take to enhance maritime security 
and oceans management in the IOR, and to engage constructively in the region. They exploit 
the common interest of Indian Ocean coastal and island states in the maritime environment, 
its resources and security. While there is growing concern for the future stability of the 
region, the maritime domain offers the potential for important “building blocks” for the 
establishment of the regional cooperation and dialogue that would contribute to maritime 
security in the region. 
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